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T HE past survey year did not include a legislative session and thus, in
the words of one court, there was no risk, from a legislative standpoint,
of any person losing their life, liberty, or property in the workers' compen-
sation arena.' Enactments from previous sessions, however, provided sub-
stantial fodder for the appellate gristmill.
One general trend that should be noted is that workers' compensation
cases filed in Texas district courts are on the increase, as are total disposi-
tions of lawsuits involving workers' compensation benefits. 2 The pendu-
lum has clearly swung back toward trial litigation in this area of the law,
contrary to a trend in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which saw fewer cases
filed and fewer cases disposed of by jury verdict.3
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Course of Employment. The Texas Workers' Compensation Act 4 requires
that for an employee's injury to be covered it must be sustained in the
course of employment.5 The phrase "course of employment" includes in-
juries of "every kind and character having to do with and originating in
the work, business, trade or profession of the employer."'6 Recently, in
Carson v. Industrial Underwriters Insurance Co.7 a jury finding denying
* B.A., Baylor University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Irving, Texas.
I. See Estate of A.B., I Tucker 249 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1866): "[N]o man's life, liberty or
property are safe while the Legislature is in session."
2. Statistics from 51 TEX. CIv. JUD. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. ANN. REP.
130 (1979) show the following number of new cases filed in Texas district courts during the
five years previous to 1980:
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 5-year average
6,239 7,567 7,823 8,406 7,962 7,599
Figures from the annual reports also indicate the following number of cases tried to a jury
verdict:
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 5-year average
334 446 527 514 482 460
Id. at 133; 50 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. ANN. REP. 142 (1978); 49
TEX. JUD. COUNCIL & OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN. ANN. REP. 141 (1977); 48 TEX JUD.
COUNCIL ANN. REP. 116 (1976); 47 TEX. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 120 (1975).
3. See Collins, Workmen's Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J.
131, 131 (1974).
4. TEX. REV. ClV. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309i (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980-1981).
5. Id art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
6. Id
7. 586 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ).
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Act coverage was reversed on appeal. In Carson an employee-teacher was
injured as she was unloading teaching supplies and materials from her car
at the religious school where she was employed. A trial court jury refused
to find that she was injured in the course and scope of her employment.8
The appellate court observed, however, that there was simply "no evi-
dence" that the worker did not receive an injury at the time and in the
manner she described. 9 The teacher testified that the school did not have
the special supplies that she intended to use during her class on the date of
her injury. She further stated that it was a part of the teacher's job to bring
supplies to the school. Thus, the court held that the jury's failure to find
that Carson was injured in the course and scope of her employment was
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.10
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Miller" a jury verdict for
the plaintiff was sustained when the plaintiffs decedent was found dead at
a trash pit on a dairy farm where he normally tended to odd jobs. 12 The
evidence indicated that it was part of the decendent's regular duties to col-
lect and burn trash, that his body was found lying in the trash pit where
the trash was burned, and that the trash had been collected and burned
properly earlier that morning. The court found this to be sufficient evi-
dence, both legally and factually, to support the jury's finding that the de-
cedent was both an employee and was in the course and scope of his
employment at the time of his death.' 3
Similarly, the Waco court of civil appeals in Texas Employers' Insurance
Association v. Lee 4 found that a carpenter who was run over by his own
car in a parking lot near a construction site was injured in the course and
scope of his employment pursuant to the "access doctrine."' 5 The court
observed that the access doctrine enables an employee to recover for on-
the-job injuries that occur within "a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to
be done."' 6 In the instant case the carpenter had to walk through streets to
get to work and return on the streets to his automobile. The court re-
viewed the important cases dealing with the access doctrine in Texas' 7 and
noted that the extraordinary circumstances that produced the injuries in
this case occurred within a few minutes after work and while the employee
was preparing a safe route to leave in his automobile from an area within
his employer's work site, designated and maintained by the employer for
employee parking. 18
8. Id at 945.
9. Id at 944.
10. Id at 945.
11. 596 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
12. Id at 624, 627.
13. Id at 624.
14. 596 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
15. Id at 943-47.
16. Id at 943.
17. Id at 945-47.
18. Id at 947.
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Analysis similar to the access doctrine has prevailed in other cases. For
example, Monte Whiting was a ranch foreman and lived south of Mid-
land, Texas, in a trailer house on a company trucking yard. 19 He was on
call twenty-four hours a day. One evening after work, he went out to
check on some trucks and began drinking. He fired several shots from a
pistol he was carrying and a deputy sheriff and highway patrolman drove
to the trucking yard. As the law enforcement officers approached Whiting,
he was shot and killed. At the time of his death, a pathologist testified that
his blood alcohol was.18. The jury found that Whiting was injured within
the course and scope of his employment.20 The appellate court affirmed
this jury finding,21 noting that if an employee is required to live on his
employer's premises, either by contract or by the nature of the employ-
ment, and is continuously on call, the entire period of his presence on the
premises is deemed to be included in the course of his employment.
22
An unusual situation arose in United States Fire Insurance Co. v.
Biggs,23 a case involving a part-time law clerk employed in Amarillo in
the law offices of Tom Upchurch, Jr. One of Upchurch's associates in-
structed the clerk, Biggs, to make repairs to the associate's apartment roof.
Biggs testified that before his injury the associate told him that this was
one of his duties as a clerk and that he should list it on his hours for the
law office. Upchurch, the employer, testified however, that he would not
have permitted the law clerks to perform personal missions for the associ-
ates. As fate would have it, during his repair of the roof, Biggs fell two
stories to a concrete driveway and sustained injuries. The Amarillo court
of civil appeals held that the record compelled a holding that as a matter of
law the injuries were not sustained in the course of the law clerk's employ-
ment.24 The court observed that the evidence was conclusive that Biggs's
injury had no connection with the practice of law.25 Also, there was no
testimony to the effect that the associate had authority as the employer's
agent to direct Biggs's actions beyond the scope of Upchurch's practice or
profession. Biggs was placed in an unfortunate dilemma: if he complied
with the associate's order, he forfeited any compensation protection, and if
he did not comply, he argued that he would have been fired. The appellate
court observed, however, that there was no evidence in the record that
19. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Whiting, 597 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1980, no writ).
20. Id at 505.
21. Id at 505, 507.
22. Id at 506. Additionally, the appellate court observed that the opinion testimony
from the pathologist was not conclusive and was not binding on the jury since there was
substantial testimony from the wife that shortly before the shooting the decedent was sober.
id at 507.
23. 601 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980). [Editor's Note: After this Article
went to print, the supreme court reversed the holding of the court of civil appeals. 611
S.W.2d 624 (Tex. 1981). This decision will be discussed in next year's Survey].
24. 601 S.W.2d at 135.
25. Id One could argue, however, that the undisputed record in this case clearly indi-
cates that but for Biggs's employment at Upchurch's law office, he would not have been on
the roof on the day of his injuries.
19811
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Biggs's employer, Upchurch, would have fired him had he refused to per-
form the personal mission for the associate. 26 From a close reading of the
evidence, it does appear that there was a factual dispute as to whether the
injured employee was instructed by an associate to perform certain duties
during his working hours as a law clerk. Further, the record establishes
that he was told to follow orders given by anyone in the office. Thus, there
does seem to be a factual dispute in this case, a dispute that the jury re-
solved in the law clerk's favor. 27 Nevertheless, the Amarillo court of civil
appeals saw it in a different light.
In the only case dealing with the "course and scope" issue decided by
the Texas Supreme Court during the survey period, the court held in Free-
man v. Texas Compensation Insurance Co.28 that a telephone company em-
ployee was in the course and scope of his employment when he was killed
in a one-car collision after having taken a polygraph examination at the
request of his employer.29 Because there was evidence, or at least an infer-
ence from the evidence, that the decedent had been directed by his em-
ployer to take the polygraph test, the court ruled that the case came within
the "special mission" exception 30 to article 8309, section l(b),31 which nor-
mally bars recovery for injuries sustained by an employee while travel-
ing. 3
2
Employee Versus Independent Contractor. Cases continue to arise under
the Act concerning the question of whether an individual is entitled to the
benefits of the compensation scheme itself. In Bogard v. Highlands Insur-
ance Co. 33 the plaintiffs' decedent was found dead in his pickup truck on
the lease of a drilling company. The decedent performed pumping chores
for the drilling company and had entered into a written contract that con-
tained a paragraph describing him as an independent contractor. The
plaintiffs sought to circumvent the contractual provision by submitting evi-
dence from a former drilling company employee to the effect that this sim-
ple contractual provision did not reflect the actual working practice. The
court held that this testimony did not raise a fact issue as to the "right of
control" test as set forth in Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 34 which held that
evidence outside the contract must be produced to show that despite the
terms of the primary agreement the true operations were such that the
right of control was vested in the alleged master. 35 Consequently, the
26. Id. at 137.
27. Id at 132.
28. 603 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1980).
29. Id at 192.
30. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967) provides for an exception
when "the employee is directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another
place."
31. Id.
32. 603 S.W.2d at 192.
33. 601 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
34. 380 S.W.2d 582, 591-92 (Tex. 1964).
35. 601 S.W.2d at 958-59.
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plaintiffs in Bogard were held not entitled to benefits. 36
Suits Against Nonsubscribers, Employers. In one of the more significant
cases decided during the survey period, the court in Copelin v. Reed Tool
Co. 37 held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act 38 did not prohibit a wife's cause of action against an employer for
loss of consortium. 39 In Copelin the wife's husband sustained severe brain
damage that left him in a coma. The parties had stipulated that at the time
of the accident the injured worker was employed by a subscriber to Texas
Workers' Compensation Insurance and that the employee was injured in
the course of his employment. The wife alleged that her husband's injury
was caused by the employer's "intentional misconduct. ' 40 On these facts
and allegations the court ruled that constitutional prohibitions4' prevented
the Act from being a complete bar to the wife's cause of action.4 2 The
court went on to say that because the wife's recovery for personal injuries
was her separate property,43 her rights as a nonemployed spouse could not
be forfeited by the employment of her husband by a subscriber to workers'
compensation insurance."4
An unusual fact situation arose in Hazelwood v. Mandrell Industries
Co. 45 In 1973, a Houston employer, a nonsubscriber, sought to limit its
responsibility for industrial injuries and death claims by making a contract
with its employees that benefits for on-the-job injuries and death would be
limited to monetary amounts provided by the "industrial compensation
laws of the State of Texas and such compensationpro vision shall be the limit
Of our liability to yourself andyour dependents in the event of a claim by you
against the Companyfor personal injuries."' 46 An employee died in Africa
while working for this employer, and his surviving widow sought to re-
cover more than the amounts provided under the Texas Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The court noted that voluntary employment contracts
providing that recoveries for industrial injuries sustained while working
for a nonsubscribing employer were to be determined by the measure of
benefits provided under the Workers' Compensation Act had been held
valid and enforceable by several courts.47 In this case, however, because
the employer did not waive its right to assert its common law defenses, the
36. Id. at 959.
37. 596 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980). The judgment of the
court of civil appeals was affirmed by the supreme court, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 96 (Dec. 6,
1980).
38. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
39. 596 S.W.2d at 303-04.
40. Id at 303.
41. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides that "every person for an injury done him, in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law."
42. 596 S.W.2d at 303-04.
43. Id. at 304; see Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978).
44. 596 S.W.2d at 304.
45. 596 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




court ruled that the contract was contrary to public policy, despite the fact
that it may not have resulted in actual injury to the plaintiffs. 48 The court
adopted as its test for determining whether a contract is contrary to public
policy the tendency of the agreement to be injurious to the public good.49
In Harrison v. Harrison50 an employer was found guilty of a failure to
furnish reasonably safe and suitable machinery to an employee who was
injured by a log that fell from a loaded log truck.5' The employer was a
nonsubscriber at the time of the injury in question and was thus deprived
of his common law defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the
risk, and fellow servant negligence.5 2 In this case the evidence revealed
that the trailer from which the logs fell was in bad shape, the standards
that held the logs were bent, and the springs of the trailer were weak. The
court found that this evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding
that the employer failed to provide reasonably safe and suitable machinery
to the employee.53
In Gray v. City of Orange54 a city policeman was killed in the course and
scope of his employment for the city of Orange, Texas. The city, however,
was not carrying workers' compensation insurance, nor had it qualified as
a self-insuror pursuant to article 8309e-2. 55 The decedent's survivors sued
the city for its failure to take any action to see that compensation benefits
were provided city employees. The city answered that the matters alleged
in the plaintiffs petition arose out of and were connected with the exercise
of police power by the city, a governmental function, for which the city
was not responsible at law. The Beaumont court of civil appeals ruled that
the self-insurance provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act were
merely permissive and, thus, the statute created no duty on the part of the
city to provide workers' compensation insurance for its employees. 56
Appealing Industrial Accident Board Awards-Deadlines. Cases continue
to arise each survey period that deal with the deadlines involved in appeal-
ing an award of the Industrial Accident Board. Article 8307, section 5
states in mandatory terms that an appeal from a board award shall be filed
within twenty days after the appealing party has given the statutory notice
of appeal to the board.5 7 Although the point seems rather elementary,
Texas courts again dealt with cases wherein the appealing party failed to
name the proper opposing parties in a lawsuit filed in district court. In
48. Id. at 206.
49. Id.
50. 597 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
51. Id. at 479.
52. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
53. 597 S.W.2d at 485.
54. 601 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ retd n.r.e.).
55. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 88, § 18, at 200 (codified at TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 8309h (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981)).
56. 601 S.W.2d at 101-02.
57. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980-198 1).
[Vol. 35
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
New York Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Ehlinger58 the board awarded
death benefits to the widow and two children of a worker. The insurance
carrier, however, named only the decedent-worker as the defendant in its
appeal to the district court. The carrier argued that its failure to name the
beneficiaries was merely a "misnomer" of parties and, thus, that its appeal
was timely filed against the beneficiaries. The appellate court rejected this
argument, holding that the naming of only the deceased as the defendant
was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the remaining beneficiaries.5 9
Because the beneficiaries were not joined until after the twenty-day period
for appeal had expired, the Court ruled that the trial court had no jurisdic-
tion and that it had properly dismissed the suit.60
The timeliness of an appeal obviously affects the right of the parties to
raise venue challenges in that the statute now provides that a suit may be
filed in the county where the injury occurred, or in the county where the
injured worker resided at the time of the injury.61 In Garcia v. Texas Em-
ployers' Insurance Association62 the sole question before the court was
whether the premature filing of a suit in district court in Hidalgo County
conferred jurisdiction on that court. The worker, who maintained his resi-
dence in Hidalgo County, was injured in Hale County. Before the Indus-
trial Accident Board entered its award, the worker filed suit in the county
of his residence. The appellate court held that no jurisdiction was vested
in the district court and that the race for fixing venue does not commence
until after the award has been made by the board.63 The court reasoned
that if there is no award to set aside, there can be no litigation in the dis-
trict court because the cause of action has not matured until an award is
entered by the board.64
The 1979 Texas Supreme Court decision in Ward v. Charter Oak Fire
Insurance Co. ,65 in which the court ruled that if a notice of appeal is de-
posited in the mail one day prior to the expiration of the twenty-day statu-
tory period, and received by the board not more than ten days after the
expiration of that period, it shall be deemed timely filed,66 was again con-
strued in Tamez v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association.67 In Tamez
the injured worker mailed his notice of intent to appeal on the twentieth
day after the board's award, and the notice of intent to appeal was received
by the board on the twenty-first day. The appellate court ruled that this
notice was not timely, however, because, under Ward, a notice of intent to
appeal must be mailed by first-class mail, properly addressed and stamped,
58. 593 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
59. Id at 433.
60. Id
61. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
62. 597 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refed n.r.e.).
63. Id at 520.
64. Id
65. 579 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1979).
66. Id at 910-11.
67. 599 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
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at least one day before the last day of the time period.68 As the notice in
Tamez was not mailed until the last day of the twenty-day period, the
court ruled that it was not timely filed by mail.69 This result seems harsh.
Because the appellate time periods for civil cases have been relaxed to
some extent,70 it would seem reasonable to do the same in the workers'
compensation area.
Good Cause. One of the procedural requirements facing a workers' com-
pensation claimant is that the claim for compensation benefits must be
filed within six months from the date of injury.71 Notice of the injury must
also be given to the employer within thirty days following the injury.72
These two hurdles may be circumvented if "good cause" is established for
late filing of the claim or for the failure to give the employer notice within
the prescribed period. 73
A self-employed claimant successfully established the "good cause" re-
quirement in Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hill.74 The claimant,
the owner of an independent gasoline and oil distributing company, in-
jured his left hip while at work. The insurance carrier paid all medical and
compensation benefits for eight months and had the claimant sign a docu-
ment designated "employee's wage agreement." Previously, the injured
employee had signed the "employer's first report of injury" that was filed
with the board. The court upheld the jury's finding in favor of "good
cause" based largely on the claimant's testimony that the insurance ad-
juster, whom he had known since 1958, visited him in the hospital and told
him everything would be taken care of.75
In Burleson Independent School District v. Johnston76 an injured em-
ployee was successful in establishing that she felt that her back injuries
were trivial and thus that she had good cause for delaying to file her claim
for compensation benefits for some thirty-four months after her accident.
After the claimant sustained her back injury she continued to work as a
cook in a school cafeteria. She stated that she wanted to work and be-
lieved that her back condition would get better; it continued to bother her,
however, and worsened until finally she could no longer work. The jury
resolved the good cause issue in favor of the injured worker, and the ap-
pellate court affirmed, stating that the facts were such that a jury question
was created as to whether her belief that her injuries were not serious
would have been entertained by a reasonably prudent person in the same
68. Id at 117.
69. Id
70. Modifications in appellate procedure governed by the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are discussed in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, p. 393 infra.
71. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 586 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. Id at 190.
76. 598 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
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or similar circumstances. 77
Another claimant obtained a reversal of a summary judgment in favor
of the insurance carrier on the issue of good cause when she established
facts to support her failure to file a compensation claim for a period of
some twenty-two months. In LeBlanc v. MarylandAmerican General Insur-
ance Co. 78 the injured worker sustained a back injury while lifting a crate
of tomatoes and was off work for between seven and nine days. She then
went back to work on light duty. No physician informed her that she had
a serious injury, but she later had to have back surgery. After her injury
and up until the time she filed her claim, the claimant maintained that she
did not believe that her injury was serious even though she had periodic
episodes of pain. Because the insurer presented no evidence to counter this
belief, the appellate court ruled that a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether the claimant had good cause for filing late.79
An unusual procedural wrinkle was introduced in Texas General Indem-
nity Co. v. Bomer.80 There the insurance carrier argued that the trial court
had committed error in permitting a trial amendment that alleged good
cause for failure to file a compensation claim within the allotted time. In
his original petition, the plaintiff alleged that timely notice was given to the
Industrial Accident Board. The insurance company denied this allegation,
but the trial court allowed the plaintiff to file a supplemental pleading that
alleged good cause.8' The defendant failed to object to the motion for
leave to file a supplemental pleading, did not plead surprise, and did not
ask for a continuance at that time. The appellate court observed that al-
lowing trial amendments is within the sound discretion of the court and,
that in this instance, no abuse of discretion was shown. 82 On the merits of
the good cause issue the court found that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding of good cause in that the plaintiff introduced
evidence that the plaintiffs doctor had informed him that he was recover-
ing and that his suffering was unrelated to his injury.83
Another appeal from a summary judgment order in favor of the insur-
ance carrier was at issue in Turner v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 84
There the claimant alleged in her amended petition that she had timely
filed a claim for compensation with the board within six months of her
injury or, in the alternative, that if the claim had not been timely filed, she
had good cause for failing to do so. The insurance carrier answered with a
general denial and later moved for summary judgment. In response to the
motion for summary judgment, the claimant answered and attached her
affidavit asserting good cause for her failure to file her claim in time. The
77. Id at 37.
78. 601 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
79. Id at 754.
80. 588 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
81. Id at 646.
82. Id
83. Id at 646-47.
84. 592 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
19811
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claimant further argued that the trial court had improperly rendered sum-
mary judgment because the insurance carrier had failed to file a sworn
denial of her allegations concerned good cause, and that, under rule 93(n)
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, such an allegation is conclusively
presumed to be true. The appellate court agreed with both arguments and
overturned the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 85 The court fur-
ther stated that there was no waiver of the verification point even though
the claimant failed to point out in time the lack of a verified denial because
the insurer had never raised the issue of good faith in the form of a de-
nial. 86
Notice to the employer is also required when an "occupational disease"
is at issue.87 Article 8307, section 4a requires that the worker provide no-
tice to the employer or insurance carrier "within thirty. . . days after the
happening of an injury or the first distinct manifestation of an occupa-
tional disease." s88 Likewise, the Act requires that if an injured worker sus-
tains an injury flowing from an occupational disease that is the result of
repetitious traumatic physical activity, then notice is required from the
date "disability" is caused thereby. 89 In Home Insurance Co. v. DeAnda9°
the worker claimed compensation benefits as a result of repetitious trau-
matic activity, which is defined as an occupational disease under the stat-
ute.91 The insurance company denied that it or the employer had received
notice within the thirty-day period. The appellate court found that the
undisputed evidence indicated that the worker had incurred a "disability"
from the repetitious traumatic activity long before the time that notice of
the occupational disease was given.92 The court believed that the statutory
period did not begin to run from the date of total disability, but rather
from the date that any compensable disability occurred. 93 Consequently,
the claimant was denied recovery because the compensable disability oc-
curred more than thirty days before notice was given.94
A similar notice problem arose in Commercial Insurance Co. v. Smith.9
In that case the worker claimed disability as a result of an allergic reaction
to chemical substances used by her employer in its manufacturing process.
The issue was at what time the occupational disease first distinctly mani-
fested itself. The insurance carrier by sworn denial contended that the em-
ployer did not have notice within the statutory time limits. One of the
interesting aspects of this case is that no jury issues were submitted on the
85. Id at 16.
86. Id
87. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4 (Vernon 1967).
88. Id
89. Id.
90. 599 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), rep'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 160
(Dec. 31, 1980).
91. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
92. 599 S.W.2d at 125.
93. Id at 126.
94. Id
95. 596 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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notice question. Although there was no dispute as to whether the worker's
supervisor had notice of the occupational disease on the day following the
diagnosis, there was some dispute as to whether the worker had suffered
difficulties a year or so before her symptoms were actually diagnosed as an
occupational disease. The appellate court acknowledged the problems in
dealing with establishing a fixed date for a gradually or slowly developing
condition. 96 It observed that occupational diseases manifest themselves at
different times.97 As a result, the court held that the time limitation for
notice begins to run when the claimant, as a reasonable man or woman,
recognizes the nature of the disease.98 The court ruled that in the instant
case notice had been established as a matter of law.99
Wage Rate. Disputes over the wage rate appear in the reported decisions
on a regular basis. Because weekly compensation benefits are on the rise,
this element of the claimaint's case will become increasingly important in
the future. '00
In Texas Employers'Insurance Association v. Miller 10' the insurance car-
rier argued that the "just and fair wage rate" could not be used as a meas-
ure of average weekly wage as defined in article 8309, section 1.102 In
general a claimant must first prove that the average weekly wage cannot be
computed under the first two subsections of the definition of average
weekly wage contained in article 8309 before being entitled to rely on the
just and fair method of proving average weekly wage. 10 3 Pursuant to a
request for admissions under rule 169,104 the claimant established that the
deceased had not worked 210 days of the year immediately preceding his
death, and that there were not one or more employees of the same class as
the deceased who worked at least 210 days of the year immediately preced-
ing his death. The appellate court thus found that the carrier essentially
had admitted that the average weekly wage computation could not be per-
formed under the first two methods provided by article 8309, section 1.105
Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's submission of the just and
fair wage rate issue.' 06
In Pan American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hill 0 7 an unusual wage rate
96. Id at 664.
97. Id
98. Id at 665.
99. Id.
100. As of Sept. 1, 1980, the weekly compensation rate was $133, and a total and perma-
nent disability award for 401 weeks, discounted, now totals $46,005. See TEX. REV. CV.
STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 29 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). As a result of a 1973 amendment, the
weekly compensation rate is automatically increased by $7 per week for each $10 increase in
the manufacturing and production worker's average weekly wage in Texas as annually de-
termined and reported by the Texas Employment Commission. Id
101. 596 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
102. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
103. 596 S.W.2d at 625; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
104. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
105. 596 S.W.2d at 625.
106. Id.
107. 586 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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problem arose when the president of a small corporation was injured on
the job. The company president, due to his retirement, drew no salary or
wages during the year preceding the injury. It was established, however,
that the corporation was making $100 per week that was being retained by
it as profit. The injured employee argued that these retained profits consti-
tuted an "other advantage" to be used in calculating the correct average
weekly wage pursuant to subsection four of the definition contained in ar-
ticle 8309.108 In a rather restrictive interpretation of that subsection the
appellate court did not "believe" that this earned profit was the equivalent
of a wage or salary.10 9 Another procedural problem that prevented the
employee from receiving full compensation benefits centered around a
wage rate stipulation that was presented to the board and the trial court,
providing that a fair and just weekly compensation rate should be the sum
of $19.20 per week. Because there was no objection to the offering of the
stipulation, the appellate court found no trial court error in entering judg-
ment based on the stipulation.1 10
Medical Causation and Heart Attacks. The connection between an on-the-
job event and a resulting injury annually produces some of the most hotly
contested cases in workers' compensation law."' The past survey year was
no exception.
An instructed verdict in favor of the insurance company was affirmed in
Cavazos v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 112 when the injured worker failed to
produce evidence that his job was strenuous or that, on the day in ques-
tion, he actually engaged in an activity involving overexertion or an unu-
sual stress." 3 The plaintiff sought compensation benefits following a
stroke. This case apparently was tried on an "accidental injury" theory"14
and the appellate court observed that it must first determine whether there
was evidence "of an undesigned, untoward event involving overexertion or
strain which is traceable to a definite time, place and cause."" 15 The court
went on to stress that the fact that an employee sustains an injury while on
the employer's premises is not sufficient to establish a right to recovery
108. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
109. 586 S.W.2d at 191.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Stodghill v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979);
Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1976); Webb v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 517 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. 1974); Baird v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 495 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.
1973); Griffin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 450 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1969); Insurance Co. of
North America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. 1969).
112. 590 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
113. Id at 175-76.
114. The Workers' Compensation Act defines an injury to mean "damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp.
1980-198 1). To be compensable the injury must be shown to have been accidental. Hender-
son v. Travelers Ins. Co., 544 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1976).
115. 590 S.W.2d at 175 (citing Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d
859, 859 (Tex. 1972)).
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under the Act.' 1 6 In this case the court found no evidence that the claim-
ant suffered an injury on the day in question within the purview of the
Workers' Compensation Act." 17 The opinion provides an excellent cata-
logue of stroke and heart attack cases in which recovery was denied be-
cause there was no evidence to support a finding that the claimant's stroke
or heart attack resulted, at least in part, from some type of overexertion or
strain experienced during the course of employment." 18
Disputes frequently arise as to whether an injury has been caused by an
on-the-job "event" so as to make the injury work-related. In Lumbermen's
Underwriting Alliance v. Bell' ' 9 a thirty-two-year-old worker suffered a
heat stroke and died a short time thereafter. The attending physician
stated that the death was caused by cardiac arrest due to heat stroke. An
autopsy was performed, and the pathologist concluded that certain medi-
cations may have been a factor in the death. The insurance carrier at-
tempted to argue that the deceased was taking Navane and Mellaril for a
nervous condition that was unrelated to his job, and that these drugs had
precipitated his untimely demise. The trial court, however, refused to ad-
mit the pathologist's testimony.' 2 0 The appellate court sustained this ex-
clusion, stating that the insurance carrier failed to establish properly that
the deceased actually took the drugs in question at or near the time of his
death.12 1 The court reasoned that this "possibility" evidence was too spec-
ulative to be admitted.'22
An interesting medical causation question arose in Texas Employers' In-
surance Association v. Schaefer, 2 3 in which the claimant attempted to es-
tablish that his disease, mycobacteriosis intracellular, arose out of the
course and scope of his employment. The plaintiff, a plumber, frequently
worked in soil contaminated by human feces and on occasion went under
houses where different kinds of fowl as well as sheep and goats had been
kept. The plaintiffs expert witness stated that, based on reasonable medi-
cal probability, the claimant's disease was an occupational disease. 124 The
116. 590 S.W.2d at 176 (citing Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148,
151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ refd n.r.e.)).
117. 590 S.W.2d at 176.
118. Id
119. 594 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
120. Id at 570.
121. Id at 571.
122. Id at 572.
123. 598 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), afl'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 163 (Jan.
3, 1981).
124. 598 S.W.2d at 926. The question propounded to the plaintiff's medical witness and
the answer thereto were as follows:
Q. (A)ssume the term occupational disease means a disease which arises out
of and in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the
physical structure of the body and I'll ask you whether or not you have an
opinion based on reasonable medical probability as to whether the atypi-
cal tuberculosis from which Mr. Schaefer is suffering, as it applies in his
case, whether it is an occupational disease within that definition?
A. Yes, sir. I think it is.
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court found, however, that the medical evidence was inconclusive as to
how the bacteria actually entered the claimant's body.' 25 Further, the
court found no indication that the disease had ever been found in the
county or in the particular soil where the plaintiff worked.' 26 The appel-
late court concluded that the medical expert's testimony, in substance, re-
vealed that it was based on mere possibilities and conjecture.127 The court
thus held that the plaintiff had failed to establish an occupational dis-
ease. ' 28 The court then dealt with the plaintiffs theory of repetitious phys-
ical traumatic activity. 129 A questionable result was reached when the
court concluded "that mycobacteriosis intracellulare is, in this case, an 'or-
dinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the
employment.' "130 If the medical causation link was missing in the plain-
tiffs presentation of the case, a quantum leap seems to be required for one
to conclude that a mysterious disease is "an ordinary disease of life."
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Booth,131 a heart attack
case, an injured employee recovered for the effects of an injury pursuant to
article 8306, section 20,132 which defines occupational disease. The claim-
ant presented evidence of job-related anxiety, tensions, pressure, over-
work, and mental and physical strain accompanied by repetitious physical
and emotional traumatic activity. Further, he presented evidence showing
that his work had increased, and that two men in his department had re-
signed and were never replaced. The injured employee's physician testi-
fied that the employee suffered from arteriosclerotic heart disease with
recent acute myocardial infarction. The jury returned findings in favor of
the injured employee, but further found that the claimant suffered inca-
pacity as a result of arteriosclerosis and that this incapacity contributed
fifty percent to his occupational disease incapacity. 33 The carrier argued
that article 8306, section 22134 prohibited recovery when an occupational
disease is aggravated by any other noncompensable disease or infirmity
and that the heart attack constituted one disease while the arteriosclerosis
was another, noncompensable, disease. The Amarillo court of civil ap-
peals rejected this argument, noting that the insurance company did not
attempt to establish by medical evidence that the diagnosed condition was
in fact two diseases.' 35 Therefore, because the evidence established that
the injured employee had suffered only one disease, the court ruled that
the carrier was precluded from receiving any contribution as a result of a
125. Id at 927.
126. Id
127. Id at 927-28.
128. See id
129. Id at 928; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
130. 598 S.W.2d at 928.
131. 586 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
133. 586 S.W.2d at 182.
134. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 22 (Vernon 1967).




In another heart injury case, Fair v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 13 7 the
worker attempted to show that he had sustained an accidental heart injury
and that the jury's failure to find such injury 138 was against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence. The claimant was employed as
a road construction equipment operator and, after working for approxi-
mately fifteen minutes on the day in question, he had to leave the job as a
result of chest pain and other symptoms. The worker's medical witness
indicated that operating heavy equipment in cold weather could well ag-
gravate or become an aggravating cause of heart pain to anyone who had
preexisting heart diseases, but the appellate court concluded that the jury's
finding of "no injury" was not against the great weight and preponderance
of the evidence. 139
Subsequent Injuries and Sole Cause. There was only one case decided dur-
ing the survey period discussing whether an insurance company's liability
for an injury can be reduced by evidence of previous or subsequent inju-
ries that are the sole cause of the plaintiffs disability. In Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Peoples' 40 the plaintiff, a truck driver, sustained a back
injury in January 1976, but had sustained earlier injuries in 1972 and 1974
that resulted in his receiving a laminectomy and a discetomy. The claim-
ant also suffered another injury in May 1977, and the insurance company
argued that this injury was the "sole cause" of plaintiffs disability. The
trial court excluded evidence showing that the worker had sustained the
injury subsequent to the one at issue and that the claimant, once again,
had to undergo back surgery.' 41 The appellate court examined article
8306, section 12c, 142 its amendments, and the major cases interpreting that
section, 43 and concluded that, at the time of the injury to the plaintiff, the
1971 amendment to article 8306, section 12c clearly made the carrier liable
"for all compensation."' 44 The court noted that under this amendment
Texas Employers'Insurance Association v. Creswell145 had held that "proof
of a prior compensable injury was inadmissible for the purpose of reduc-
ing the worker's recovery."' 146 Proof of such prior injuries, however, was
admissible for the purpose of showing that the prior injury was the sole
136. Id
137. 602 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
138. Id at 578.
139. Id at 582.
140. 595 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). One other
case allowed prior injury evidence to be admitted when, essentially, there was no objection
by plaintifls counsel. Watkins v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 592 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
141. 595 S.W.2d at 137.
142. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
143. 595 S.W.2d at 138-40.
144. Id at 139.
145. 511 S.W.2d 58, 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
146. 595 S.W.2d at 139.
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cause of the claimant's present disability.147 In a rather exhaustive analy-
sis of past cases dealing with the prior and subsequent injury issue, the
Peoples court stated: "It can fairly be concluded that we are without gui-
dance as to the admissibility of evidence of the effects of a later injury."' 48
The court further correctly pointed out that article 8306, section 120 49 uses
the phrase "previous injury" and that to include within that phrase "subse-
quent" injuries strains its construction.150 Nevertheless, in reversing the
trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, the court ruled that evidence of the
subsequent injury was admissible, stating that "to impose on an insurer
liability for permanent and total incapacity produced solely by an injury
other than that which gave rise to the litigation would be to adopt an inde-
fensibly harsh rule."' 5 '
Suits to Set Aside Compromise Settlement Agreements. The overwhelming
majority of workers' compensation claims are settled by compromise set-
tlement agreements.' 5 2 This procedure is authorized when the insurance
carrier's liability or the extent of the employee's injury is: (1) uncertain;
(2) indefinite; or (3) incapable of being satisfactorily established. 153 Under
certain conditions, however, settlement agreements may be set aside, usu-
ally by district court determination.
In order to set aside a compromise settlement agreement in a workers'
compensation case, the plaintiff must show that false representations were
made by the insurance carrier or its agent, that the plaintiff relied on such
representations, that the claim was meritorious, and that the plaintiffs in-
jury is greater than the amount paid pursuant to the compromise settle-
ment agreement.' 5 4 In Middleman v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. 155 the
wife of a deceased worker was successful in overturning a motion for sum-
mary judgment granted in favor of the insurance carrier. The court found
that the wife's summary judgment proof raised a fact issue as to whether
the insurance company's agent fraudulently misrepresented the workers'
compensation law to her and misinformed her about the timeliness of
filing her claim for compensation death benefits.' 56 The appellate court
observed that "fraud vitiates every transaction tainted by it.' 157 The wife
in this case did not even file her suit to set aside the agreement for about
147. Id (citing Mayfield v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 539 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ret'd n.r.e.)).
148. 595 S.W.2d at 139.
149. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
150. 595 S.W.2d at 139-40.
151. Id at 140.
152. See TEXAS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 30, which indi-
cates that 36,337 claims were settled pursuant to compromise settlement agreements between
the parties and approved by the board.
153. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 12 (Vernon 1967).
154. Brannon v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 289, 293, 224 S.W.2d 466, 468
(1949).
155. 597 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).




six years. She alleged that she did not learn about how unfair the settle-
ment was until that time and thus limitations in her case begun to run from
the time that the fraud might have been discovered by the use of reason-
able diligence. 158
A worker was successful in setting aside a compromise settlement agree-
ment when she established that the insurance carrier's medical statements
with respect to the length of her disability were inaccurate.159 The insur-
ance company submitted the written reports of the doctors to the claimant
and her attorney at a prehearing conference where the settlement agree-
ment was reached. Because the insurer used the doctors' reports in settling
the case, the court ruled that such use made the doctors agents of the in-
surer.' 60 The court concluded that the fact that false representations were
made was sufficient to overturn the settlement and held that the "[a]bsence
of bad faith does not negate the claimant's cause of action."' 61
In a similar case, 162 a worker was unsuccessful in setting aside a com-
promise settlement agreement in that he was unable to prove that the inac-
curate doctor's reports grew out of any conduct of the insurance company.
In this case, the injured worker consulted his own doctor for treatment of
his injury, and there was no proof or showing that any misrepresentations
or false statements were made by an authorized agent of the insurance
carrier. 163
Injury and Occupational Disease. During the survey period the appellate
courts continued to define the parameters of article 8306, section 20,164
which were broadened in 1971 to change the definition and scope of theterm "injury" as it is used in the Act. In 1979 the Texas Supreme Court in
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn165 held that repetitious mental
stimuli extending over a period of time did not fall within the definition of
"injury." The Austin court of civil appeals expanded on the Maksyn hold-
ing in University of Texas System v. Schieffer. 66 There the injured worker
was employed in a language laboratory at the University of Texas at Aus-
tin and testified that she was under a heavy work load and that a supervi-
sor's conduct resulted in her having a nervous breakdown. The university
system argued that Mrs. Schieffer's injuries were not compensable under
158. See Wise v. Anderson, 163 Tex. 608, 611, 359 S.W.2d 876, 879 (1962).
159. Yarbrough v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
160. Id at 558.
161. Id; see Graves v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 138 Tex. 589, 595, 161 S.W.2d
464, 466-67 (1942).
162. Valdez v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 602 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
163. Id at 346; see Bullock v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 254 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, writ ref'd).
164. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
165. 580 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. 1979). For a more extended discussion of this significant
case, see Muldrow, Workers' Compensation, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 323,
331-32 (1980).
166. 588 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ retd n.r.e.).
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the statute. The court observed that her experience with her supervisor
had no relationship to "repetitious physical traumatic activities."' 167 The
claimant sought to rely on the expert testimony of two psychologists who
diagnosed her condition as a hysterical neurosis with a passive-aggressive
personality trait that resulted in a loss of weight, tightened chest, loss of
voice, spasms, and an inability to cope with her job. The appellate court
believed that this testimony established that mental stimuli produced the
condition for which compensation was sought, 168 thus running afoul of the
holding in Maksyn.' 69 The court further observed that the trial court's
definition of injury failed to conform with the Maksyn definition by failing
to define the term with respect to "accidental injury" and that the worker
failed to secure an independent finding by the jury on accidental injury. 170
Accordingly, judgment was reversed and rendered in favor of the Univer-
sity of Texas System.171
Another case involving the definition of occupational disease and injury
was Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Burris.172 In that case the claimant was
a truck driver who argued that he sustained both an injury and an occupa-
tional disease. The claimant asserted that he was required physically to
exert himself in driving a Mack truck and that such driving subjected him
to severe jolting up and down. He further alleged that he had great diffi-
culty in turning the truck in cities when the traffic was heavy, that he was
forced to drive long trips, and that he was forced to make such trips too
close to each other without rest or nourishment. The appellate court ob-
served that there was no evidence of any repetitious physical traumatic
activity arising out of the course of his employment as a truck driver. 173
Rather, the court found that the proof supported a claim for compensation
based on repetitious mental activities and thus fell within the Maksyn 174
rule prohibiting such cause of action. 17 Additionally, both physicians
who testified in the case indicated that all of the occupational diseases
complained of by the claimant were ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is exposed and were not indigenous to the worker's job as a
truck driver. 176 The court thus found that the "ordinary diseases of life"
defense was established as a matter of law pursuant to article 8306, section20.177
167. Id. at 604 (emphasis added).
168. Id at 605.
169. 580 S.W.2d at 338.
170. 588 S.W.2d at 605.
171. Id at 606.
172. 600 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
173. Id at 406.
174. 580 S.W.2d at 338.
175. 600 S.W.2d at 406.
176. Id
177. Id at 406-07. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1980-198 1)
provides in part: "Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of
the employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases follow as an incident
to an 'Occupational Disease' or 'Injury' as defined in this section."
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Death Benefits. On September 1, 1973, the Texas Workers' Compensation
Act was amended to allow a widow or widower of a deceased employee
compensation in the form of lifetime weekly benefits. 178 In the event of
remarriage, the beneficiary is also entitled to receive a lump sum payment
equal in amount to the benefits due for a period of two years. 179 There is
no clear indication in the statute, however, as to what effect remarriage has
on the liability of the carrier to remaining beneficiaries.
In Freeman v. Texas Compensation Insurance Co. 180 the supreme court
held that upon remarriage, the surviving spouse is to receive a lump sum
payment equal to the amount of benefits that the spouse would have re-
ceived if there had been no remarriage. 18 Additionally, concerning the
remaining beneficiaries, the court indicated that although the eligibility of
various beneficiaries may change, the overall amount of the carrier's liabil-
ity remains unaffected.' 82 Thus, the court ruled that redistribution of the
weekly benefits to the remaining beneficiaries is necessary after remar-
riage. 183 In order to avoid exceeding the statutory limitation on weekly
benefits set forth in article 8306, section 8(a),' 84 however, the court held
that redistribution of the benefits to the minor survivors should not occur
until two years after remarriage.' 85
In another death benefits case' 86 the Fort Worth court of civil appeals
ruled that the widow of a husband who died at work had no cause of
action against the workers' compensation insurance carrier under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act 187 when it
failed to settle "promptly and fairly" her compensation claim.' 88 The
court found that the decedent was not a consumer within the Act in that he
had not purchased goods or services from the insurance company.189
In Carswell v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 190 an employee's heirs sought
to recover the unpaid portion of a lump sum award made by the Industrial
Accident Board. Prior to his death the injured employee filed suit to set
aside the lump sum award. The court ruled that the employee's claim did
not survive the employee's death when the death was unrelated to the on-
the-job injuries.19' The court acknowledged the general rule that a claim
178. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
179. Id § 8(b).
180. 603 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1980).
181. Id at 189 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981)). For a similar holding, see Blankenship v. Highlands Ins. Co., 594 S.W.2d 147, 149-
52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
182. 603 S.W.2d at 189.
183. Id at 189-90.
184. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
185. 603 S.W.2d at 191.
186. Rodriguez v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 598 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
188. 598 S.W.2d at 679.
189. Id at 678.
190. 598 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
191. Id at 21.
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for specific injury benefits does survive the death of an employee and may
be enforced by the employee's heirs, but stated that a claim or even an
award of benefits for a general injury does not survive the injured em-
ployee's death unless the award has been reduced to a final judgment or
has otherwise fully matured. 192 The court further observed that there is no
statutory provision for the survivability of a claim for general injury. 193
Wrongful Discharge. Article 8307c 94 prohibits an employer from dis-
charging or discriminating against an employee because the worker, in
good faith, has filed a compensation claim, hired a lawyer, or instituted
any proceedings under the Act. Only one case addressed the issue of
wrongful discharge during the survey period. In Murray Corp. v.
Brooks' 95 the employer failed to persuade a jury that it had legitimate
reasons for discharging an injured worker. 96 The employee was a long-
haul truck driver who had filed two previous workers' compensation
claims and was discharged following a spinal fusion operation due to his
most recent injury. It was undisputed that the injured worker was not
given a reason for his discharge until his lawyer propounded interrogato-
ries to the employer in the discrimination lawsuit. In that suit the em-
ployer belatedly attempted to argue that the worker was more than usually
"accident prone," thus creating a danger to himself and exposing the em-
ployer to unreasonable risks of liability. The employer also argued that an
economic downturn was an additional reason for the injured worker's dis-
charge. The appellate court meticulously reviewed the evidence and con-
cluded that the employer knew that the injured worker was making
compensation claims and that the payment of workers' compensation
claims by the insurance company would raise the employer's insurance
rates. 197 Thus, the court concluded, there was probative evidence to sup-
port the jury finding that the injured worker was discharged or discrimi-
nated against because he instituted proceedings under the Workers'
Compensation Act. 198
The employer was likewise unsuccessful in arguing that the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the discharge was a
"proximate cause" of any damage to the plaintiff. The court observed that
the statute does not require that the discharge be a proximate cause of the
damage suffered by an employee, only that damages suffered be "a result
of the violation."199
Nursing Services. When an injured worker's spouse provides nursing serv-
ices that are usually performed by a person engaged in the nursing profes-
192. Id at 22. See also Bailey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. 1964).
193. 598 S.W.2d at 22.
194. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
195. 600 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
196. Id at 899.
197. Id at 903.
198. Id at 903-04.
199. Id at 904.
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sion, the insurance carrier is liable for compensation benefits for those
nursing services, but a spouse cannot recover for services that are normally
rendered in the course of the marital relationship. 2°° In United States Fi-
delity & Guaranty Co. v. Roberts201 a jury's award of $30,000 to the wife of
an injured worker for a two-year period of nursing services was upheld as
being within the range of evidence presented to the trial court.202 The in-
jured worker had received various injuries in a drilling rig explosion that
severely impaired his ability to take care of himself. As a result, the in-
jured worker's spouse had to provide twenty-four-hour nursing services to
her husband. The insurance carrier argued that $30,000 was excessive and
that the services could be provided at a cheaper rate, but this argument
was rejected by the appellate court, which stated that even though the
amount awarded was high, it was not excessive under the evidence
presented.203
In another case involving nursing services 2°4 the injured worker's hus-
band was held not entitled to recover for cooking services and household
cleaning following her back surgery.205 The jury simply refused to find
that nursing services were required as a result of the injuries in question.20 6
Hernia Injury. Even though the Workers' Compensation Act has been in
existence since 1913, the question of whether an employee is entitled to
weekly benefits from the date of the injury to the date of a hernia opera-
tion had never been resolved. The Texas Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Clem v. Dallas Independent School District,20 7 wherein Clem had
been totally disabled for some fifty-seven weeks before his successful her-
nia operation. The school district paid Clem twenty-six weeks of compen-
sation, but refused to pay the additional benefits for the remaining thirty-
one weeks between the date of his injury and the date of his operation.
Chief Justice Greenhill observed that because section 12b of article 8306208
did not make a provision for disability from the time of the injury to the
time of the operation, an employee must be compensated for that period of
time as a general injury.209 It was further noted that the specific language
of the statute stated that the ceiling of twenty-six weeks' worth of compen-
sation is limited to disability suffered after the operation.2I1 As a result, the
supreme court held that Clem was entitled to fifty-seven weeks of compen-
200. Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1966); Finch v. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n, 564 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
201. 598 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. Id at 51.
203. Id
204. Rendon v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 599 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. Id at 896.
206. Id at 892. Note, however, that no instructions were given the jury with regard to
nursing services. Id
207. 600 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1980).
208. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12b (Vernon 1967).





Third-PartyActions. In the event that the conduct of a party other than the
employer causes injury to an employee, suit may be brought against such a
third party to recover damages over and above benefits received under the
Act.21 2 In a case of first impression in Texas, Cohn v. Spinks Industries,
Inc,213 a surviving widow and a child sued the decedent's employer for
fatal injuries arising out of a helicopter crash. The plaintiffs argued that
the employer was strictly liable in tort under the "dual capacity" doctrine.
The dual capacity doctrine arises when an employer, normally exempted
from tort liability, arguably becomes liable in tort to his employee if he
occupies a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of
those imposed on him as an employer. 2' 4 The defendant answered the
plaintiff's argument by saying that because the decedent was an employee
he was covered by workers' compensation insurance, and therefore, the
defendant-employer was entitled to the immunities prescribed by article
8306, section 3 of the Act. 215 The appellate court observed that there were
no Texas cases that directly addressed the applicability of the dual capac-
ity doctrine to workers' compensation law.216 The court noted that the
arguments against adoption of the doctrine were more compelling under
the current state of Texas law.2'7 The court believed that the adoption of
such a doctrine would do considerable violence to the statutory language
indicating a legislative intent that the workers' compensation remedies be
exclusive.
218
Article 8307, section 6a was substantially amended in 1973. 219 These
amendments specifically eliminated the requirement that an injured em-
ployee proceed against the compensation carrier before asserting a third-
party action.220 Questions continue to arise, however, concerning the ef-
fect of those amendments. In Penguin Industries, Inc. v. Junge22' the third
party argued that limitations on the plaintiffs' claims should begin to run
on September 1, 1973, when the impediment to third-party claims was re-
moved by amendment. In this case, the plaintiffs' injuries occurred on or
about July 10, 1973. The Waco court of civil appeals rejected this argu-
ment, noting that when the cause of action arises prior to September 1,
1973, the third-party action is governed by article 8307, section 6a as it
existed prior to the 1973 amendments. 222 Under the earlier version of sec-
211. Id at 927.
212. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
213. 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 103.
215. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
216. 602 S.W.2d at 102.
217. Id at 104.
218. Id
219. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
220. Id; see Robinson v. Buckner Park, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
221. 589 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
222. Id at 847.
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tion 6a,223 the statute of limitations was tolled for third-party actions dur-
ing the prosecution of the workers' compensation claim.224 For causes of
action arising after September 1, 1973, the limitation period begins to run
from the date of injury and is governed by the general statute of limita-
tions, article 5526.225 Thus, under Junge, the amendments to article 8307,
section 6a are prospective only. 226
Article 8306, section 3,227 the exclusive remedy provision, comes into
play in third-party cases when the third party seeks contribution or indem-
nity from the employer. That statute specifically provides that the sub-
scriber-employer has no liability to reimburse the third party, nor does the
subscriber have any tort or contract liability to the third party "in the ab-
sence of a written agreement expressly assuming such liability, executed by
the subscriber prior to such injury or death. ' 228 In General Elevator Corp.
v. Champion Papers229 the third party argued that article 8306, section 3 is
in conflict with the Texas Comparative Negligence Act, 230 and that this
later statute either repeals or takes precedence over the former article.231
The appellate court rejected this argument on the ground that there is no
specific language in the comparative negligence statute that expressly re-
peals article 8306, section 3, and further, that there was no basis for any
repeal by implication.232 The third party also argued that it should be
entitled to contribution from a grossly negligent employer. This argument,
likewise, was rejected in that it is prohibited by the express terms of article
8306, section 3.233 The court stated that a third party is barred from re-
ceiving contribution even though the survivors of an employee may re-
cover against a grossly negligent employer.234
In another case235 construing the provisions of article 8306, section 3, the
court held that an owner may seek contribution and indemnity from a
drilling contractor for injuries to the drilling contractor's employee when a
contract specifically providing for such indemnity was executed before the
employee's injury.236 In this case the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the drilling contractor-employer when the third-party
owner sought contribution or indemnity arising out of an employee's in-
223. 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 103, pt. IV, § 3b, at 293.
224. Campbell v. Sonford Chem. Co., 486 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1972).
225. 589 S.W.2d at 847; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
226. 589 S.W.2d at 848. See also Potter v. Crump, 555 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1977, writ retd n.r.e.); Robinson v. Buckner Park, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.).
227. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).
228. Id.
229. 590 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
230. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
231. 590 S.W.2d at 764.
232. Id. at 764-65.
233. Id at 765.
234. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
235. Petroleum Exploration & Operatin$ Corp. v. McCutchen Drilling Co., 593 S.W.2d
831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
236. Id at 833.
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jury.237 Due to the existence of a written contract, the appellate court re-
versed the trial court, holding that the Workers' Compensation Act was
not a bar to the contribution and indemnity suit brought by the third party
against the employer. 238
Article 8307, section 6a, as amended in 1973,239 provides for the recov-
ery of attorney's fees for the claimant's attorney in third-party cases in
which the compensation carrier also obtained a recovery from the third
party. During the survey year, there were two cases that reversed awards
of attorney's fees to claimant's attorneys because of the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court's finding pertaining to the attorney's fee.
In Insurance Co. of North America v. Stuebing240 the trial court entered an
award in favor of the claimant's attorney for services rendered in the pros-
ecution of the third-party action.24' The compensation carrier had also
retained counsel to actively represent its interest. In this situation, the stat-
ute provides that the court "shall award and apportion an attorney's fee
allowable out of the association's subrogation recovery between such attor-
neys taking into account the benefit accruing to the association as a result
of each attorney's service, the aggregate of such fees not to exceed thirty-
three and one-third per cent (33-1/3%) of the subrogated interest. ' 242 The
Fort Worth court of civil appeals found that although the award of an
attorney's fee to claimant's counsel was appropriate in this case, the evi-
dence presented was insufficient to support an award of $5,500: the claim-
ant's lawyers, though proving their time expended in rendering services in
the case, failed to present proof of the value of that time.243 Thus, on
retrial, the court suggested that care be taken in proving the total of the
attorneys' time and that the proof should be restricted to the time devoted
to an investigation of the facts and the law with respect to the prosecution
of the third-party tort action.244 Stuebing clearly indicates that in order to
recover an attorney's fee from the compensation carrier's subrogation,
claimant's counsel must present accurate time records and proof of time
and efforts expended, as well as evidence concerning the value of that
time.2
45
In the event that an insurance carrier does hire an attorney to actively
represent its interest, a fact issue may still arise as to whether the insurance
company's lawyer did indeed "actively" participate in the prosecution of
the third-party action. This was the situation in International Insurance
Co. v. Burnett & Ahders, Associated.246 There the compensation carrier
retained a lawyer and filed a plea in intervention in the third-party case;
237. Id at 832.
238. Id at 833.
239. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
240. 594 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
241. Id at 566.
242. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
243. 594 S.W.2d at 568.
244. Id
245. Id
246. 601 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980. writ refd n.r.e.).
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the intervention, however, was filed after the defendant's deposition had
been taken. The trial court awarded fees to the claimant's counsel and
specifically found that the insurance company's interest was not actively
involved or not "actively represented" by an attorney.2 47 On appeal, the
El Paso court of civil appeals expressed some frustration with the amend-
ments to article 8307, section 6a, stating that they may serve as a model of
confusing legislation.2 48 Nevertheless, the court observed that there were
three separate conditions under which an attorney for a claimant may re-
cover attorneys' fees out of the compensation carrier's subrogation award:
(1) Where the intervenor is represented by counsel, but he does not
actively represent the intervenor,
(2) Where the claimant's attorney represents both the claimant and
the intervenor, and
(3) Where the intervenor is represented by an attorney who actively
represents the intervenor's interest. 249
The appellate court found that there was insufficient evidence to support
the trial court's finding that the insurance company's lawyer had not ac-
tively participated in the lawsuit.250 The court noted that the insurance
company's lawyer reviewed the compensation file, filed a plea of interven-
tion, sought a stipulation as to the amount of the subrogation, and negoti-
ated a settlement with the tortfeasors' lawyer resulting in a payment of
$14,000 to the compensation carrier.25' Accordingly, the court reversed
the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to that court.252
The defense of third-party actions is sometimes full of traps for the un-
wary, as illustrated by Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Manufacturing Co. 253
The plaintiff in Guerrero recovered damages for hand injuries that he re-
ceived while operating a grinding machine. At trial a defensive issue was
raised as to whether the plaintiff was a "borrowed servant" at the time of
his injury and whether his exclusive remedy was under the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The jury found that the defendant-employer had the right
to direct and control the details and methods by which the plaintiff was
working on the occasion in question, thus rendering the defendant liable if
found negligent. 254 The defendant, however, neither pleaded nor proved
that it had workers' compensation insurance. The appellate court ruled
that without proof of coverage, judgment should have been entered below
for the plaintiff.255
II. PROCEDURAL LAW
Variation Between Claim and Pleadings. A claimant may not assert one
247. Id at 200.
248. Id
249. Id at 201.
250. Id
251. Id at 202.
252. Id
253. 598 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id at 657.
255. Id
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injury before the Industrial Accident Board and a claim of an entirely dif-
ferent character at the courthouse; for the trial court to have jurisdiction,
the cause of action asserted in the district court must be essentially the
same as that filed with and acted upon by the Industrial Accident
Board.256 An interesting aspect of this rule was presented in Martinez v.
Commercial Standard Insurance Co. 257 Notice of injury was filed with the
board on its form, stating that a nail had hit the injured worker in his left
eye, injuring both eyes. In the "Claimant's Narrrative Summary," the at-
torney asserted that the case had developed into a general injury in that
the claimant developed a psychiatric problem out of fear of losing his eye-
sight. In the trial court, the claimant alleged a general injury. The insur-
ance carrier filed a plea in abatement, which was sustained by the trial
court, that asserted a fatal variance between the claim presented to the
board and the one before the trial court.258 The appellate court reserved
and denied the insurance company's arguments, stating that even though
there was no amended claim filed, a claimant's narrative summary could
be a proper enlargement of the original claim and was deemed to be such
in this case because it was not at variance with the court pleadings.259
Another interesting pleading point was raised in Cope Construction Co.
v. Power.260 There the injured worker was thrown from the tailgate of a
company pickup truck. The insurance carrier filed suit to set aside the
Industrial Accident Board award, questioning whether the claimant was
injured in the course of his employment. The claimant countered by filing
a common law tort claim in the same county against his employer. The
insurance carrier filed a motion to consolidate both actions, along with a
plea of privilege in the tort action. The appellate court ruled that, without
reserving its right to file a plea of privilege, the employer had waived its
plea of privilege by insisting on its motion to reconsider the court's deci-
sion to consolidate the actions. 26' The court viewed the motion to recon-
sider as an attempt to invoke "the judicial power of the court in a manner
inconsistent with a continuing intention to insist upon the plea." 262
Estoppel. In Safeco Insurance Co. ofAmerica v. Broadnax263 the claimant
had filed a lawsuit against Travelers Insurance Company asserting that he
was an employee of a labor placement agency. He settled his lawsuit in
court and later asserted that he was a borrowed servant of the employer to
whom he had been sent by the placement agency. The claimant subse-
256. Select Ins. Co. v. Patton, 506 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974,
no writ); Solomon v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 347 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1961, writ refd).
257. 599 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
258. Id at 859.
259. Id
260. 590 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
261. Id at 722.
262. Id (quoting 1 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE, Venue § 4.40, at 572-74
(rev. ed. 1965)).
263. 601 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
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quently filed a lawsuit against the second employer. The appellate court
held that the claimant was judicially estopped to assert its claim because it
was predicated upon facts contrary to those asserted in the previous suit.264
The court observed, however, that the mere receipt of compensation bene-
fits from one carrier does not preclude a suit against another compensation
carrier: "It is the assertion of the right to benefit in a judicial proceeding
and a subsequent settlement of the dispute that precludes a subsequent suit
based on the same claim but asserting inconsistent facts."'265
In Thate v. Texas & Pacific Railway266 an injured worker was estopped
from asserting a claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA).267 The worker was injured while performing duties in a flatbed
railroad car and successfully prosecuted a claim for workers' compensation
benefits against a trucking company. In a damage suit against the railroad,
he attempted to argue that he was entitled to FELA benefits because he
was a borrowed servant of the railroad at the time of the incident. The
appellate court held that by his election to represent himself as an em-
ployee of the trucking company for purposes of receiving benefits under
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, the employee was estopped from
claiming that he was also an employee of the railroad for purposes of re-
covering under the FELA.268 Of interest in Thate is the fact that the court
did not require an actual suit against the compensation carrier in order to
bar the subsequent claim against the railroad under the FELA. Appar-
ently, under Thate, the mere receipt of benefits under the Act is sufficient
to establish the estoppel doctrine. Such a holding may not accurately re-
flect the state of the law in light of the supreme court's action in a case
involving workers' compensation benefits and group medical benefits.
Bocanegra v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 269 concerned the election of rem-
edies between workers' compensation benefits and a nonoccupational
health insurance policy. The claimant asserted a workers' compensation
claim for an occupational injury that was disputed by the carrier. This
claim ultimately was settled. The claimant then asserted her right to medi-
cal expenses for the same condition under the nonoccupational health pol-
icy. The supreme court held that an election will not bar a subsequent suit
when the original claim is grounded upon uncertain and undetermined
facts, depriving the claimant of the requisite knowledge to make an in-
formed election, and settled for less than the full value because of disputed
264. Id at 467. The court cited the doctrine set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in
Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Huckabee, 558 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1977): "[T]he receipt of a settle-
ment in the action against the insurance company, based on an assertion that the loss was
covered by insurance, precluded a subsequent suit based on an inconsistent theory, i.e., that
the loss was not covered by insurance." 601 S.W.2d at 467. The Broadnax court viewed the
Huckabee rule as equally applicable to a workers' compensation action, in which the subse-
quent suit is based on an inconsistent allegation that the worker served a different employer
at the time of the injury. Id. at 468.
265. 601 S.W.2d at 468.
266. 595 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
267. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
268. 595 S.W.2d at 595.
269. 605 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1980).
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liability and the uncertainty of the final outcome.270 The court held that
one may receive something of value by way of settlement under an uncer-
tain claim, without making an election that bars recovery against another
person. 27 1 Bocanegra follows the rationale of Lee v. Texas General Indem-
nity Co. ,272 in which the supreme court disapproved of a lower court opin-
ion holding that testimony that one injury was the sole cause of incapacity
created an estoppel from pursuing an action for a prior injury.273
The appellate court's holding in Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Mc-
Kay274 illustrates the critical importance of the pleadings in a motion for a
new trial following the granting of a default judgment. In that case the
claimant was awarded a default judgment because of the carrier's failure
to appear on the date of the trial setting. A motion for a new trial was
filed, asserting that the carrier was not given notice of the trial setting; the
motion was unsworn, however, and the trial court was given no affidavit or
other evidence substantiating any allegedly meritorious defense. The ap-
pellate court observed that a medical report attached to the carrier's plead-
ing was not verified as a true copy, and further noted that it was dated a
year prior to the trial date and, thus, could not have been relevant or estab-
lished a defense at the time of trial.275 The court concluded, therefore, that
the insurance carrier failed to meet its burden of setting aside a default
judgment, and affirmed the trial court.276
Venue. The Texas Workers' Compensation Act was amended in 1977 to
provide for venue in several places: the county of the injured worker's
residence; the county in which the injury occurred; or the county of the
defendant's residence. 277 In Anderson v. Texas General Indemniy Co. 278
the injured employee's suit was dismissed by the trial court. Both the em-
ployee and the insurance carrier appealed from the Industrial Accident
Board's award; the carrier filed suit in Dallas County to set aside the
award, while the employee filed suit three weeks later in Tarrant County.
The insurance company filed a motion to dismiss the employee's Tarrant
County suit, which was granted by the trial court in Tarrant County on the
ground that a previously filed suit had been instituted by the carrier in
Dallas County. 279 Based on these facts, the court of civil appeals held that
the Tarrant County court should more properly have abated the Tarrant
County suit pending a resolution of the case in Dallas County, Texas.
280
The court thus held that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit in Tar-
270. Id at 852-53.
271. Id. at 852.
272. 584 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1979).
273. Id. at 701.
274. 595 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
275. Id at 886-87.
276. Id at 887.
277. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
278. 592 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).





The continuing dispute between Rodolfo A. Reyes and the Texas Em-
ployers' Insurance Association once again reached the appellate courts
during 1980. In Reyes v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association282 the
insurance carrier filed an appeal from a board ruling in Robertson County,
Texas, the county where the injury occurred. The employee, Reyes, later
filed a plea of privilege to be sued in Maverick County, the county of his
residence. Although the insurance company failed timely to controvert
Reyes's plea of privilege, the trial court, determining that good cause ex-
isted for the late filing, overruled Reyes's plea.283 Reyes appealed, and the
Waco court of civil appeals reversed, finding that good cause was not
shown by the carrier and that the carrier's controverting plea was thus of
no effect.284 The Waco court rejected the carrier's argument 285 that a plea
of privilege is not the proper way to challenge venue in a workers' com-
pensation case.286 On April 26, 1979, the court ordered that the case be
281. Id
282. 599 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ reed n.r.e.).
283. 581 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ dism'd).
284. Id at 272.
285. The following is the Waco court of civil appeals' statement of the carrier's unique
argument:
In other words, Appellee argues that under Article 8307, Sec. 5, as amended in
1977, venue is proper in either Robertson County (the place of injury) or Mav-
erick County (the place of Reyes's domicil): that such statute created a "race
to the courthouse" in workmen's compensation cases; that if both parties are
dissatisfied with the ruling of the Industrial Accident Board, the first party to
file suit has his choice of forum; that in the instant case, Texas Employers
"won the race" by bringing the suit in Robertson County, thereby precluding
Reyes from any right to venue in Maverick County, the county of his resi-
dence. Moreover, Appellee says that Article 8307a still requires that if a suit
to set aside a final ruling of the Board is brought in any county other than the
county where the injury occurred, unless that court has jurisdiction, it must
transfer the case to the county where the injury occurred. In short, Appellee
asserts that a plea of privilege is not the proper way to challenge venue in a
workmen's compensation case, and that "the only proper way to transfer cases
brought under Article 8307, Sec. 5 is by a plea to the jurisdiction made under
Art. 8307a."
Id
286. Id at 271 (citing Texas Highway Dep't v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1967); Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ellis, 543 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ)).
[Editor's Note: In last year's Survey Article on Workers' Compensation the Waco court in
Reyes was criticized for its reliance upon Jarrell and Ellis, as well as its failure to mention
certain other venue cases. Muldrow, Workers' Compensaion, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
34 Sw. L.J. 323, 353-54 (1980). Specifically, Ellis was distinguished as involving TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), which governs the venue of cases.
brought to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board when the injuries have been
sustained outside of Texas, rather than id art. 8307, § 5, which governs venue in cases in
which the injuries were sustained within Texas. Muldrow, supra, at 353. In light of the 1977
amendment of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981), a com-
pensation claimant is afforded a choice of counties in which to bring suit. The claimant who
has been injured outside of Texas is offered a similar panoply of forums under id art. 8306,
§ 19. Thus, the holding in Ellis, that the proper procedure for the determination of venue in
cases involving foreign injuries, and governed by § 19 of art. 8306, is by plea of privilege,
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ellis, 543 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no
writ), would seem analogous to the Waco court's decision in Reyes that, under art. 8307, § 5,
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transferred to Maverick County for a trial on the merits. 287 In the
meantime, the carrier had moved the district court in Maverick County to
abate and dismiss Reyes's suit because of the carrier's prior filing of an
appeal in Robertson County. On May 18, 1979, the Maverick County
court abated Reyes's suit and dismissed it with prejudice. 288 The Waco
court's order did not become final until May 24, 1979. Reyes appealed the
Maverick County court's order to the San Antonio court of civil appeals.
The San Antonio court ignored the merits of the appeal, instead con-
cluding that the case before it was moot.289 The court reasoned that be-
cause the Waco court's transfer of the carrier's suit to Maverick county had
become final, and because Reyes had the privilege of litigating in the
county of his domicile, there was no need to determine whether the Maver-
ick County court was correct in dismissing Reyes's suit. 290 Accordingly,
the court dismissed Reyes's suit and set aside all orders entered therein.
29
'
Court's Charge. Numerous procedural wrinkles continue to appear in
workers' compensation litigation concerning proper construction and anal-
ysis of the court's charge. There are some problems that the State Bar of
Texas, Pattern Jury Charges book simply does not address. One of these
was illustrated in a recent case 292 where the jury dead-locked during delib-
eration. A supplemental charge was given to the trial court:
Members of the Jury:
I have your note that you are dead-locked. You request further
instructions. This case was ably tried, and in the interest of justice, if
you could end this litigation by your verdict, you should do so.
I don't mean to say by that that any individual person on the jury
should yield his own conscience and positive conviction, but I do
mean that when you are in the jury room, you should discuss this
matter among yourselves carefully and listen to each other, and try, if
you can, to reach a conclusion on the issues. It is the duty of jurors to
eep their minds open and free to every reasonable argument that
may be presented by fellow jurors that they may arrive at the verdict
which justly answers the consciences of the individuals making up the
jury. A juryman should not have any pride of opinion, and should
avoid hastily forming or expressing an opinion. He should not sur-
render any conscientious views founded upon the evidence unless
convinced by his fellow juror of his error.
I am satisfied, ladies and gentlemen, that you have not deliberated
sufficiently. Accordingly, I return you to your deliberations.293
the plea of privilege is the proper means of contesting venue in a workers' compensation
case. 581 S.W.2d at 272.]
287. 581 S.W.2d at 272.
288. 599 S.W.2d at 840.
289. Id
290. See id at 839-40.
291. Id at 841.
292. Anzaldua v. American Guarantee & Liab. Co., 596 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
293. Id at 224.
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The appellate court observed that the above charge contained no element
of coerciveness on its face, and that this supplemental charge passed the
litmus test for supplemental charges as set out by the supreme court in
Stevens v. Travelers Insurance Co. 294 Thus, the court concluded that there
was no error in the above supplemental charge.295
Rule 277 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure clearly authorizes a dis-
junctive submission of special issues, when two or more alternate grounds
of recovery have been developed through the pleadings, evidence, and the
submitted issues.296 The rules authorize a disjunctive issue dealing with
"partial and total incapacity. '2 97 In Burns v. Union Standard Insurance
Co. 298 the supreme court specifically endorsed the use of a disjunctive sub-
mission to determine whether a worker's disability was a general injury or
a specific one. 299 In Burns the special issue dealing with the general or
specific injury was submitted in the following form:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff
[Mrs. Burns] received an injury on or about September 30, 1974,
which included her hip and back, or was such injury confined to her
left foot and leg below the knee?"
"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such injury
included her left hip and back, you will answer 'It included her hip
and back'; otherwise, you will answer 'It was confined to her left foot
and leg below the knee.'"
"ANSWER: It was confined to her left foot and leg below the
knee.,,3oo
The injured worker contended that the submission of the issue in this form
constituted an inferential rebuttal issue outlawed by rule 277 and by the
Texas Supreme Court in Select Insurance Co. v. Boucher.30 The court
observed that the evidence of the trial court in this case related almost
entirely to the question whether the injury was a general injury to the hip
and back rather than a specific one, confined to the foot and leg below the
knee. 302 The court ruled that the case fell within the defined parameters of
rule 277 authorizing the submission of disjunctive issues and affirmed the
trial court.303
Numerous alleged errors in the trial court charge constituted the basis
for appeal in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Fuentes.3°4 In
Fuentes the insurance company had admitted, in answers to requests for
294. 563 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978).
295. 596 S.W.2d at 224.
296. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
297. Select Ins. Co. v. Boucher, 561 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. 1978).
298. 593 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1980).
299. Id at 311.
300. Id at 310-11.
301. 561 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1978).
302. 593 S.W.2d at 310-11.
303. Id at 311 (citing 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES § 26.15,
at 26 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
304. 597 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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admissions under rule 169,305 that the worker had suffered total incapacity
for some period of time and that the injury was a producing cause of the
total incapacity. The special issue that was submitted to the jury read as
follows:
The insurance company has admitted that the injury in question was a
producing cause of total incapacity which commenced on the date of
injury. Find from a preponderance of the evidence whether such total
incapacity has been or will be permanent, or has been or will be tem-
porary.
ANSWER: Permanent.3°6
The insurance carrier objected to the submission of the above special issue
on the ground that it constituted an impermissible comment directly on the
weight of the evidence. The appellate court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that where the evidence as to a fact is positive and not disputed, it is to
be taken as an established fact and the charge of the court can proceed on
that basis.307 The court further rejected the insurance carrier's arguments
pertaining to the definition of producing cause and total incapacity. 30 8
The trial court had submitted minor modifications of those definitions as
found in 2 State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury Charges, section 22.01
(1970). In an earlier time this particular court's charge probably would not
have passed appellate muster. Fortunately, our supreme court has modi-
fied the rules to prevent the reversal of trial court judgments on mere tech-
nicalities.30 9
An injured worker is not entitled to recover for a general injury flowing
from a specific injury unless he can prove that the effects of the injury,
distinguished from the pain alone, extend to and affect another part of the
body.310 In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. McMullen3 l1 the appel-
late court reversed a trial court judgment in favor of an injured worker
who had received an injury to his hand and recovered a judgment for par-
tial, temporary disability. The insurance carrier tendered the following in-
struction, which was refused by the trial court:
An injury to a specific member does not 'extend to and affect' other
parts of the body if the use or attempted use of the injured member
merely results in pain or other subjective complaints in such other
parts of the body without producing damage or harm to the physical
structure of such parts. 31 2
The Beaumont court of civil appeals observed that it is not very often that
a trial court will be reversed for failure to give an explanatory instruc-
305. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
306. 597 S.W.2d at 812.
307. Id (citing Lloyds Cas. Co. v. Grilliett, 64 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1933, writ ref'd)).
308. 597 S.W.2d at 812-13.
309. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 with Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 (1941).
310. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1970).
311. 598 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
312. Id at 386-87. The rejected instruction was suggested in 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES § 26.26, at 8-10 (1970).
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tion.313 In this particular case, however, the court ruled that the instruc-
tion was necessary to aid the jury in its factual determinations. 314
An insurance carrer was able to establish that a trial court's charge con-
stituted an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence in Texas
Employers' Insurance Association v. Purcell.3 15 The trial court submitted a
charge modeled after the "short form" compensation charge appearing in
2 State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury Charges (1970). The trial court,
however, failed to condition the producing cause issues on an affirmative
finding of injury. The insurance carrier timely and properly objected to
these issues as "being on the weight of the evidence in that it assumes or
suggests to the Jury the fact of injury. ' 3 16 The appellate court observed
that by submitting the issues unconditionally, the trial judge assumed an
affirmative finding of injury, thereby directly commenting on the weight of
evidence, a practice condemned by Texas decisions. 317
Even though the rules for special issue submission have been balanced
on the side of reason, it still behooves counsel for both plaintiff and de-
fendant to listen carefully to the objections leveled at the charge at the time
they are made to the trial court. It is indeed frightening to realize that
hard work on a case may result in a retrial simply because of a momentary
failure to listen carefully to objections that may take no more than five to
ten seconds to be made by opposing counsel. W. James Kronzer, Jr. gave
some advice in 1961 that is still appropriate today: "From the plaintiffs
standpoint, it is a cardinal principle to agree to any objection, or to permit
the submission of any issue requested by the defense that does not seri-
ously interfere with the manner by which counsel proposes to submit his
case to the jury."3 18
Evidence--Sufficiency. The volume of cases dealing with sufficiency of evi-
dence points seems to be less than in past survey years.319 Both claimant
and insurance carrier, however, continue to contest jury findings on the
basis that the findings are against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence. In Anzaldua v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
Co. 320 the injured worker had slipped and fallen on the job, and the jury
313. 598 S.W.2d at 387.
314. Id
315. 594 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ reed n.r.e.).
316. Id at 184.
317. Id (citing 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 12.03.2 (1970)).
318. STATE BAR OF TEXAS, PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN TEXAS § 12.2, at 734
(1961).
319. For cases upholding a jury's finding that a worker was totally and permanently
disabled, see Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Welch, 595 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1980, writ refd n.r.e.), and City of Bridgeport v. Barnes, 591 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.). The insurance company was successful in overturning a
jury's finding of total and permanent incapacity in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Flores,
603 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ). Also, claimants were unsuccessful
in challenging jury findings of "partial incapacity" in Fuente v. Texas Gen. Indem. Co., 590
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ), and "no injury" in Griffin
v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 594 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
320. 596 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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awarded him partial incapacity benefits of approximately $500. The court
found that there was evidence to support the jury's finding that some of the
worker's complaints were not related to the on-the-job injury, thus war-
ranting a finding of partial incapacity.32'
321. Id at 225.
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